Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76645
Authors: 
Bohn, Henning
Stuart, Charles
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 1058
Abstract: 
We derive median-voter results and study the shape of redistributional taxes when voters elect a candidate who imposes taxes to maximize own utility. Under general conditions, a median-productivity candidate is a Condorcet winner. The imposed tax function is nonlinear, may place high marginal rates on very low incomes, and may have an interval of negative marginal rates below the income of the winning candidate. Marginal rates are positive throughout, however, if non-redistributional spending or altruism toward the poor are great enough.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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