Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76620
Authors: 
Napel, Stefan
Widgrén, Mika
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 1029
Abstract: 
The European Union (EU) has moved towards bicameralism, making the codecision procedure its most important mechanism for decision making. To gauge if European Parliament (EP) and Council of Ministers (CM) are equally powerful codecision makers', understanding of the final stage of the procedure - bargaining in the Conciliation Committee - is crucial. Here, EP and CM are assumed to have spatial preferences determined by their respective internal decision mechanisms. Applying bargaining theory to predict inter-institutional agreements in the Conciliation Committee, it turns out that although institutionally the Council and the Parliament are seemingly in a symmetric position, CM has significantly greater influence on EU legislation.
Subjects: 
European Union codecision procedure
Conciliation Committee
bargaining
spatial voting
decision procedures
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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