Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76616
Authors: 
Poutvaara, Panu
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 1114
Abstract: 
The mobility of labor reduces national incentives to invest in internationally applicable education. The European Union could overcome this by allowing member states to institute graduate taxes or income-contingent loans, collected also from migrants. This paper presents calculations on how a graduate tax system could look for Finland. To protect citizens against Leviathan governments, graduate taxes or income-contingent loans could be based on voluntary contracts. Education would then be financed publicly only for those accepting also to share the returns. With EU enlargement, such reforms could generate a triple dividend.
Subjects: 
graduate taxes
European Union
individual accounts
income-contingent loans
migration
JEL: 
F22
H24
H52
I28
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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