Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76543
Authors: 
Ponssard, Jean-Pierre
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 1186
Abstract: 
Two-player infinitely-repeated-entry games are revisited using a new Markov equilibrium concept. The idea is to have an incumbent facing a hit and run entrant. Rent dissipation no longer necessarily holds. It will not when competition is tough in case of entry. Similarities and differences with previous approaches are analyzed. Several economic illustrations are discussed.
Subjects: 
rent dissipation
Markov equilibria
hit and run
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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