Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76435
Authors: 
Banal-Estañol, Albert
Macho-Stadler, Ines
Seldeslachts, Jo
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 944
Abstract: 
We analyse the effects of investment decisions and firms' internal organisation on the efficiency and stability of horizontal mergers. In our framework economies of scale are endogenous and there might be internal conflict within merged firms. We show that often stable mergers do not lead to more e.ciency and may even lead to efficiency losses. These mergers lead to lower total welfare, suggesting that a regulator should be careful in assuming that possible efficiency gains of a merger will be effectively realised. Moreover, the paper offers a possible explanation for merger failures.
Subjects: 
horizontal mergers
investment
efficiency gains
internal conflict
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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