Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/76409 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2003
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 853
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
Private independent limited partnership venture capital funds receive capital from institutional investors, without tax incentives. Limited partnership investment activities are governed by restrictive covenants that are determined by negotiated contract between the fund managers (general partners) and the institutional investors (limited partners). By contrast, Canadian Labour Sponsored Venture Capital Corporations (LSVCCs) receive capital only from individual investors who receive tax breaks on capital contributions of up to CAN$5,000. LSVCC investment activities are governed by statutory restrictions. This chapter contrasts the governance of LSVCCs to limited partnerships. We also summarize Canadian evidence on the impact of LSVCC governance and tax incentives: (1) on the distribution of venture capital funding between private and LSVCC funds; (2) on the unusually large overhang of uninvested capital in the Canadian venture capital industry; (3) the portfolio size (i.e. number of investee firms per fund) of private funds versus LSVCCs; and (4) the performance of LSVCCs relative to other types of venture capital organiziations and other comparable investments for individual investors.
Schlagwörter: 
venture capital
Canada
tax
government
crowding out
portfolio size
governance
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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