Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76393
Authors: 
Konrad, Kai A.
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 905
Abstract: 
It can be advantageous for an office motivated party A to spend effort to make it public that a group of voters will lose from party A's policy proposal. Such effort is called inverse campaigning. The inverse campaigning equilibria are described for the case where the two parties can simultaneously reveal information publicly to uninformed voters. Inverse campaigning dissipates the parties' rents and causes some inefficiency in expectation. Inverse campaigning also influences policy design. Successful policy proposals hurt small groups of voters who lose much and do not benefit small groups of voters who win much.
Subjects: 
inverse campaigning
information
voting
policy design
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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