Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76383
Authors: 
Huck, Steffen
Konrad, Kai A.
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 948
Abstract: 
We study the profitability incentives of merger and the endogenous industry structure in a strategic trade policy environment. Merger changes the strategic trade policy equlilibrium. We show that merger can be profitable and welfare enhancing here, even though it would not be profitable in a laissez-faire economy. A key element is the change in the governments. incentives to give subsidies to their local firms. National merger induces more strategic trade policy, whereas international merger does not.
Subjects: 
merger incentives
strategic trade policy
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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