Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76281
Authors: 
Bös, Dieter
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 807
Abstract: 
This paper deals with double lobbying: several bureaucrats participate in joint lobbying to get a high total departmental budget, but they also engage in antagonistic lobbying to reap as high a share of the total budget as possible. The antagonistic lobbying constitutes a contest among the bureaucrats. This paper characterizes the Nash equilibria in lobbying and shows in which way exogenously fixed bureaucratic incomes induce the same or different lobbying behavior as incentive incomes.
Subjects: 
bureaucracy
lobbying
contests
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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