Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76064
Authors: 
Gersbach, Hans
Liessem, Verena
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 622
Abstract: 
When politicians are provided with insufficient incentives by the democratic election mechanism, we show that social welfare can be improved by threshold contracts. A threshold incentive contract stipulates a performance level which a politican must reach in order to have the right to stand for reelection. Read my lips would turn into read my contracts. Reelection thresholds can be offered by politicians during campaigns and do not impair the liberal principle of free and anonymous elections in democracies.
Subjects: 
elections
incentive contracts
democracy
JEL: 
D72
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.