Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/76048 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 734
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
This paper studies within-family decision making regarding investment in income protection for surviving spouses. A change in US pension law (the Retirement Equity Act of 1984) is used as an instrument to derive predictions both from a simple Nash-bargaining model of the household and from the classical single-utility-function model of the household. This law change gave spouses of married pension-plan participants the right to survivor benefits unless they explicitly waived this right. The predictions of the classical model are rejected in favor of the predictions of the Nash-bargaining model in the data.
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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