Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/76029 
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 601
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
We describe a model of international, multidimensional policy coordination where countries can enter into selective and separate agreements with different partners along different policy dimensions. The model is used to examine the implications of negotiation tie-in - the requirement that agreements must span multiple dimensions of interaction - for the viability of multilateral cooperation when countries are linked by international trade flows and transboundary pollution. We show that, while in some cases negotiation tie-in has either no effect or can make multilateral cooperation more viable, in others a formal tie-in constraint can make an otherwise viable joint multilateral agreement unstable.
Subjects: 
international cooperation
trade and environmental policy negotiations
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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