Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/75902
Authors: 
Schultz, Christian
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 730
Abstract: 
This paper investigates the effects on tacit collusion of increased market transparency on the consumer side of a market in a differentiated Hotelling duopoly. Increasing market transparency increases the benefits to a firm from underbutting the collusive price. It also decreases the punishment profit. The net effect is that collusion becomes harder to sustain. In the limiting homogeneous market, the effect vanishes. Here market transparency does not affect the possibilities for tacit collusion.
Subjects: 
transparency
tacit collusion
competition policy
internet
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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