Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/75872
Authors: 
Swope, Kurtis J.
Janeba, Eckhard
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 542
Abstract: 
This paper provides a positive analysis of public provision of excludable public goods financed by uniform taxes or fees. Individuals differing in preferences decide using majority-rule the provision level and financing instrument. The median preference individual is the decisive voter in a tax regime, while an individual with preferences above the median generally determines the fee in a fee regime. Numerical solutions indicate that populations with uniform or left-skewed distributions of preferences choose taxes, while a majority coalition of high and low preference individuals prefer fees when preferences are sufficiently right-skewed. Public good provision under fees exceeds that under taxes in the latter case.
Subjects: 
excludable public goods
public provision
voting
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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