Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/75842
Authors: 
Martimort, David
Stole, Lars
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 575
Abstract: 
In the context of common agency adverse-selection games weillustrate that the revelation principle cannot be applied to studyequilibria of the multi-principal games. We then demonstrate thatan extension of the taxation principle - what we term the delegation principle - can be used to characterize the set of allcommon agency equilibria.
Subjects: 
revelation principle
delegation principle
taxationprinciple
common agency
adverse selection.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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