Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/75679
Authors: 
Glazer, Amihai
Kanniainen, Vesa
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 380
Abstract: 
Consider a principal who appoints an agent. Let the agent potentially serve for a sufficiently long time that one principal is replaced by another over this period. Suppose also that the quality of the agent appointed increases with the effort the incumbent principal devotes to hiring. Then the quality of the appointment may increase with the length of the agent's term. Moreover, policies such as mandatory retirement which increase a prinicpal's concern for output after he leaves office, may induce better hiring.
Subjects: 
Hiring
tenure
quality of appointment
JEL: 
J20
J40
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.