Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/75550
Authors: 
Sibert, Anne
Year of Publication: 
1999
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 226
Abstract: 
This paper looks at how the reputation of a monetary policy making committee is jointly determined with the reputations of its individual members. I ask whether individuals ha ve more or less incentive to gain a reputation for being tough on inflation when they are part of a group. I examine the effect of increased transparency - in the form of publishing the votes of individual members - on individuals' incentives to appear hard nosed. I look at how other institutional features of central banks affect the policy making body's incentive to refrain from inflation.
Subjects: 
Reputation
collective decision making
central banks
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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