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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Economics Discussion Papers No. 2013-31
Verlag: 
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), Kiel
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper, the authors analyze the behavior of local governments on capital taxation when the financial choices in terms of a public good quality are done by a central planner. More specifically, they ask the question whether a local government has an interest to tax the mobile factor in addition to the tax on representative households or not. The authors show, through a comparison of social welfare given the strategies chosen by the locals governments, that whatever the quality of the public good and its cost is, a local government always has an interest to tax the mobile factor. This leads to a Nash-equilibrium in dominant strategy in their model.
Schlagwörter: 
tax competition
public goods
taxation
quality
welfare
JEL: 
D00
H20
H41
H70
H71
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
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Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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