Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74243
Authors: 
Gautier, Pascal
Soubeyran, Raphael
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 129.2005
Abstract: 
We propose a two dimensional infinite horizon model of public consumption in which investments are decided by a winner-take-all election. Investments in the two public goods create a linkage across periods and parties have different specialities. We show that the incumbent party vote share decreases the longer it stays in power. Parties chances of winning do not converge and, when the median voter is moderate enough, no party can maintain itself in power for ever. Finally, the more parties are specialized and the more public policies have long-term effects, the more political cycles are likely to occur.
Subjects: 
Cycles
Alternation
Public goods
Advantage
Opposition
JEL: 
D72
H41
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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