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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 129.2005
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
We propose a two dimensional infinite horizon model of public consumption in which investments are decided by a winner-take-all election. Investments in the two public goods create a linkage across periods and parties have different specialities. We show that the incumbent party vote share decreases the longer it stays in power. Parties chances of winning do not converge and, when the median voter is moderate enough, no party can maintain itself in power for ever. Finally, the more parties are specialized and the more public policies have long-term effects, the more political cycles are likely to occur.
Schlagwörter: 
Cycles
Alternation
Public goods
Advantage
Opposition
JEL: 
D72
H41
C72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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