Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74188
Authors: 
Querou, Nicolas
Beal, Sylvain
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 74.2006
Abstract: 
We define a finite-horizon repeated network formation game with consent, and study the differences induced by different levels of individual rationality. We prove that perfectly rational players will remain unconnected at the equilibrium, while nonempty equilibrium networks may form when, following Neyman (1985), players are assumed to behave as finite automata. We define two types of equilibria, namely the Repeated Nash Network (RNN), in which the same network forms at each period, and the Repeated Nash Equilibrium (RNE), in which different networks may form. We state a sufficient condition under which a given network may be implemented as a RNN. Then, we provide structural properties of RNE. For instance, players may form totally different networks at each period, or the networks within a given RNE may exhibit a total order relationship. Finally we investigate the question of efficiency for both Bentham and Pareto criteria.
Subjects: 
Repeated Network Formation Game
Two-sided Link Formation Costs
Bounded Rationality
Automata
JEL: 
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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