Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74060
Authors: 
Carraro, Carlo
Eyckmans, Johan
Finus, Michael
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 50.2005
Abstract: 
The literature on international environmental agreements has recognized the role transfers play in encouraging participation in international environmental agreements (IEAs), but the few results achieved so far are overly specific and do not exploit the full potential of transfers for successful treaty-making. Therefore, in this paper, we develop a framework that enables us to study the role of transfers in a more systematic way. We propose a design for transfers using both internal and external financial resources and making “welfare optimal agreements” self-enforcing. To illustrate the relevance of our transfer scheme for actual treaty-making, we use a well-known integrated assessment model of climate change to show how appropriate transfers may be able to induce almost all countries into signing a self-enforcing climate treaty.
Subjects: 
Self-enforcing international environmental agreements
Climate policy
Transfers
JEL: 
C72
H23
Q25
Q28
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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