Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73970
Authors: 
Naghavi, Alireza
Leahy, Dermot
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 97.2006
Abstract: 
We study the effect of the intellectual property rights (IPR) regime of a host country (South) on a multinational's decision between serving a market via greenfield foreign direct investment to avoid the exposure of its technology or entering a joint venture (JV) with a local firm, which allows R&D spillovers under imperfect IPRs. JV is the equilibrium market structure when R&D intensity is moderate and IPRs strong. The South can gain from increased IPR protection by encouraging a JV, whereas policies to limit foreign ownership in a JV gain importance in technology intensive industries as complementary policies to strong IPRs.
Subjects: 
Joint Ventures
Intellectual Property Rights
Technology Transfer
R&D Spillovers
FDI Policy
JEL: 
O34
F23
O32
F13
L24
O24
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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