Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73897
Authors: 
Dowell, Andrew
Wooldridge, Michael
McBurney, Peter
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 100.2007
Abstract: 
Qualitative coalitional games (QCG) are representations of coalitional games in which self interested agents, each with their own individual goals, group together in order to achieve a set of goals which satisfy all the agents within that group. In such a representation, it is the strategy of the agents to find the best coalition to join. Previous work into QCGs has investigated the computational complexity of determining which is the best coalition to join. We plan to expand on this work by investigating the computational complexity of computing agent power in QCGs as well as by showing that insincere strategies, particularly bribery, are possible when the envy-freeness assumption is removed but that it is computationally difficult to identify the best agents to bribe.
Subjects: 
Bribery
Coalition Formation
Computational Complexity
JEL: 
C63
C78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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