Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/73414 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
BGPE Discussion Paper No. 82
Verlag: 
Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE), Nürnberg
Zusammenfassung: 
Imposing a minimum quality standard (MQS) is conventionally regarded as harmful if firms compete in quantities. This, however, ignores its possible dynamic effects. We show that an MQS can hinder collusion, resulting in dynamic welfare gains that reduce and may outweigh the static losses which are caused by regulation's distortive effect on equilibrium qualities. Verdicts on MQS thus depend even more on the market structure at hand than has been acknowledged.
Schlagwörter: 
Minimal quality standard
Cournot competition
collusion
JEL: 
L41
L51
L15
D43
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
391.53 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.