Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/73355
Authors: 
Hanel, Barbara
Riphahn, Regina
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
BGPE Discussion Paper 9
Abstract: 
We use reforms in the Swiss public retirement system to identify the responsiveness of retirement timing to financial incentives. A permanent reduction of retirement benefits by 3.4 percent induces more than 70 percent of females to postpone their retirement. The responsiveness of male workers, who undergo a different treatment, is lower.
Subjects: 
retirement insurance
incentives
social security
labor force exit
natural experiment
Switzerland
JEL: 
J26
H55
J14
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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