Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/72572 
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 4200
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
We develop a model that relates self-control and conflict identification to cooperation patterns in social dilemmas. As predicted, we find in a laboratory public goods experiment a robust association between stronger self-control and higher levels of cooperation. This means that there is evidence for an impulse to be selfish and that cooperative behavior requires self-control effort. Free-riders differ from other contributor types only in their tendency not to have identified a self-control conflict in the first place.
Subjects: 
self-control
cooperation
public good
risk
experiment
JEL: 
C91
D03
H40
Document Type: 
Working Paper
Appears in Collections:

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.