Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/72030
Authors: 
Ball, Laurence
Mankiw, N. Gregory
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers, The Johns Hopkins University, Department of Economics 478
Abstract: 
This paper examines the optimal allocation of risk in an overlapping-generations economy It compares the allocation of risk the economy reaches naturally to the allocation that would be reached if generations behind a Rawlsian 'veil of ignorance' could share risk with one another through complete Arrow-Debreu contingent-claims markets The paper then examines how the government might implement optimal intergenerational risk sharing with a social security system One conclusion is that the system must either hold equity claims to capital or negatively index benefits to equity returns
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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