Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/72030 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2002
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 478
Verlag: 
The Johns Hopkins University, Department of Economics, Baltimore, MD
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper examines the optimal allocation of risk in an overlapping-generations economy It compares the allocation of risk the economy reaches naturally to the allocation that would be reached if generations behind a Rawlsian 'veil of ignorance' could share risk with one another through complete Arrow-Debreu contingent-claims markets The paper then examines how the government might implement optimal intergenerational risk sharing with a social security system One conclusion is that the system must either hold equity claims to capital or negatively index benefits to equity returns
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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