Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/71164
Authors: 
Bracco, Emanuele
Porcelli, Francesco
Redoano, Michela
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper: Public Finance 4167
Abstract: 
This paper argues that high political competition does not necessarily induce policy makers to perform better as previous research has shown. We develop a political economy model and we show that when political competition is tight, and elected politicians can rely on more tax instruments, they will substitute salient taxes with less salient ones, which are not necessarily preferable. These predictions are largely confirmed using a dataset on Italian municipal elections and taxes.
Subjects: 
political competition
government
accountability
tax salience
JEL: 
H11
H20
H77
H87
D70
N12
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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