Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/69992
Authors: 
Fiva, Jon H.
Folke, Olle
Sørensen, Rune J.
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper: Public Finance 4119
Abstract: 
As with the market for goods and services, democratic competition involves political parties offering their services (policy programs) to citizen-consumers who vote for their preferred partisan supplier. Little is known about the partial effect of a shift in parties' seat shares for given voter preferences, particularly in proportional representation systems. We estimate party effects using a regression discontinuity design tailored to proportional systems. Based on rich local government data, the analyses show that parties matter for fiscal policies. A larger left-wing party leads to more property taxation and higher user charges. It also leads to higher spending on child care but less on old-age care. These effects are caused both by changes in the representation of individual parties and by shifts between the party blocs.
Subjects: 
fiscal policy
proportional representation
regression discontinuity design
JEL: 
C23
D72
H71
H72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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