Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/69983
Authors: 
Groll, Thomas
Ellis, Christopher J.
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper: Public Finance 4114
Abstract: 
This study explains the observed repeated personal interactions between lobbyists and policymakers. The analysis uses a dynamic model of commercial lobbying in which citizens may hire lobbyists to present policy proposals on their behalf to policymakers. It is shown that repeated interactions with lobbyists simplify a policymaker's information problem in the presence of unverifiable information provision and allow a solution to their contracting problem. The welfare implications of these interactions depend on whether the policymakers' information or contracting problem predominates. Further, the policymaker's information problem and financial contributions may actually improve social welfare in comparison to the full information outcome.
Subjects: 
dynamic lobbying
influence activities
information acquisition
financial contributions
commercial lobbying
political access
moral hazard
JEL: 
D72
D78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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