Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/69608
Authors: 
Ellingsen, Tore
Herrmann, Benedikt
Nowak, Martin A.
Rand, David G.
Tarnita, Corina E.
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper: Behavioural Economics 4042
Abstract: 
We experimentally investigate the nature of cooperation in various repeated games, with subjects from Romania and USA. We find stark cross-country differences in the propensity to sustain multilateral cooperation through bilateral rewards and punishments. U.S. groups perform well because sufficiently many cooperators are willing to discipline free riders. Romanian cooperators are less prone to jeopardize their productive bilateral relationships for the benefit of the group, collectively failing to provide adequate discipline. Our analysis indicates that the performance differences constitute a group-level phenomenon, being largely due differences in shared beliefs rather than differences in individuals' preferences.
JEL: 
D02
D03
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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