Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/69360
Authors: 
Fevang, Elisabeth
Hardoy, Inés
Røed, Knut
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper Series, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 7137
Abstract: 
We investigate the impacts of economic incentives on the duration and outcome of temporary disability insurance (TDI) spells. The analysis is based on a large quasi-experiment in Norway, with a complete overhaul of the TDI benefit system. Our findings show that the labor supply of TDI claimants responds to both the benefit-level and to the level of local labor demand. The estimated elasticity of the employment hazard with respect to the benefit-level is - 0.3. We also find that the level of TDI benefits significantly affects the transition rate to alternative social insurance programs such as permanent disability and unemployment.
Subjects: 
temporary disability
rehabilitation
hazard rate models
labor supply
JEL: 
H55
I38
J22
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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