Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/69360 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 7137
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We investigate the impacts of economic incentives on the duration and outcome of temporary disability insurance (TDI) spells. The analysis is based on a large quasi-experiment in Norway, with a complete overhaul of the TDI benefit system. Our findings show that the labor supply of TDI claimants responds to both the benefit-level and to the level of local labor demand. The estimated elasticity of the employment hazard with respect to the benefit-level is - 0.3. We also find that the level of TDI benefits significantly affects the transition rate to alternative social insurance programs such as permanent disability and unemployment.
Schlagwörter: 
temporary disability
rehabilitation
hazard rate models
labor supply
JEL: 
H55
I38
J22
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
279.32 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.