Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/68135
Authors: 
Cartwright, Edward
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Department of Economics Discussion Paper, University of Kent 07,04
Abstract: 
We consider a model of conformity that permits a non-conformist equilibrium and multiple conformist equilibria. Agents are assumed to behave according to a best reply learning dynamic. We details the conditions under which a social norm and conformity emerge. The emergence of conformity depends on the distribution of intrinsic preferences, the relative costs and benefits of conformity and the topology of agent interaction.
Subjects: 
Social norms
conformity
best reply
JEL: 
C7
D11
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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