Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/67980
Authors: 
Abbink, Klaus
Pezzini, Silvia
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
CeDEx Discussion Paper, The University of Nottingham 2005-01
Abstract: 
This paper examines determinants of revolutionary behaviour. We study the role of freedom of communication, repression of opposition and the government's selfishness. Combining econometric analysis of survey data with a laboratory experiment, we analyse how these factors affect preferences for revolt and revolutionary action. We introduce an experimental game capturing essential features of a dictatorship. The results show that the feeling that the government operates selfishly increases both revolutionary preferences and actions. Political repression and lack of communication freedom increase revolutionary attitudes but decrease actual opposition, consistent with the collective action problem faced by opposition to a dictatorship.
Subjects: 
Conflict
revolutions
experimental economics
surveys
JEL: 
C23
C92
D74
H11
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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