Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/67976
Authors: 
Abbink, Klaus
Ellman, Matthew
Year of Publication: 
2004
Series/Report no.: 
CeDEx Discussion Paper, The University of Nottingham 2004-15
Abstract: 
Donors often rely on local intermediaries to deliver benefits to target beneficiaries. Each selected recipient observes if the intermediary under-delivers to them, so they serve as natural monitors. However, they may withhold complaints when feeling unentitled or grateful to the intermediary for selecting them. Furthermore, the intermediary may distort selection (e.g. by picking richer recipients who feel less entitled) to reduce complaints. We design an experimental game representing the donor's problem. In one treatment, the intermediary selects recipients. In the other, selection is random - as by an uninformed donor. In our data, random selection dominates delegation of the selection task to the intermediary. Selection distortions are similar, but intermediaries embezzle more when they have selection power and (correctly) expect fewer complaints.
Subjects: 
Development
Entitlement
Experiments
Fairness
Intermediaries
Monitoring
Targeting
Punishment
JEL: 
C90
D63
O12
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
232.08 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.