Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/67746
Authors: 
Usher, Dan
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Queen's Economics Department Working Paper 1208
Abstract: 
We know that people strike bargains and that civilized life could not proceed otherwise. We do not know how bargains are struck. We have no explanation of bargaining, comparable to the general equilibrium in the economy, accounting for essential features of bargaining as we know it with reference to universal self-interested behaviour subject only to economy-wide rules. This claim is supported here in a survey of the principal models of bargaining: as a reflection of a shared sense of fairness, as an imposed sequence of offers, as a source of transaction cost and as a species of conflict. Also discussed is the dual role of bargaining in politics as a necessary complement to voting and as an impediment to the exploitation of minority groups.
Subjects: 
Bargaining
Comprimise
Fairness
Self-interest
Transaction cost
Conflict
JEL: 
C07
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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