Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/67735 
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dc.contributor.authorNishimura, Yukihiroen
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-18-
dc.date.accessioned2013-01-15T14:24:24Z-
dc.date.available2013-01-15T14:24:24Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/67735-
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines the second-best tax policy to minimize envy in the sense of Chaudhuri (1986) and Diamantaras and Thomson (1990). An allocation is 'lambda'-equitable if no agent prefers a proportion 'lambda' of any other agent's bundle. We study the allocations that maximize 'lambda' among the second-best Pareto efficient allocations. In the standard two-class economy with identical preferences, the Chaudhuri-Diamantaras-Thomson allocation coincides with the leximin allocation. In many-agent economies, it is possible to order the class of second-best Pareto efficient allocations graded by progressivity in the sense of Hemming and Keen (1983), with respect to the intensity of envy. Envy is then minimized in the most progressive tax system.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aQueen's University, Department of Economics |cKingston (Ontario)en
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aQueen's Economics Department Working Paper |x1178en
dc.subject.jelD63en
dc.subject.jelH21en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordIncome Taxationen
dc.subject.keywordEnvyen
dc.subject.stwOptimale Besteuerungen
dc.subject.stwSecond Besten
dc.subject.stwPareto-Optimumen
dc.subject.stwNeiden
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleEnvy minimization in the optimal tax context-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn577758136en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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