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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/66872
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Ketterer, Tobias | en |
dc.contributor.author | Bernhofen, Daniel M. | en |
dc.contributor.author | Milner, Chris | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-11-23 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-11-27T10:40:38Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-11-27T10:40:38Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2012 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/66872 | - |
dc.description.abstract | If a free trade agreement (FTA) is characterized by the exchange of market access with a large and competitive trading partner, the agreement can cause a leakage of protectionist benefits to domestic industry from lobbying against external tariff cuts. This rent destruction effect of an FTA can free policy makers to be more aggressive in multi-lateral tariff cuts. We argue that the Canadian-US free trade agreement (CUSFTA) provides an ideal policy experiment to link this mechanism to the data. Exploring the determinants of Canada's tariff cuts at the 8 digit HS product level, we find that CUSFTA acted as an additional driver of Canadian multilateral tariff reductions during the Uruguay Round. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x3985 | en |
dc.subject.jel | F13 | en |
dc.subject.jel | F14 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | preferences | en |
dc.subject.keyword | rent destruction | en |
dc.subject.keyword | multilateral liberalization | en |
dc.subject.keyword | CUSFTA | en |
dc.subject.stw | Zollpräferenz | en |
dc.subject.stw | Freihandelszone | en |
dc.subject.stw | Interessenpolitik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Außenhandelsliberalisierung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Zolltarif | en |
dc.subject.stw | Rententheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | USA | en |
dc.subject.stw | Kanada | en |
dc.title | Preferences, rent destruction and multilateral liberalisation: The building block effect of CUSFTA | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 730414701 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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