Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/65390
Authors: 
Aidt, Toke S.
Albornoz, Facundo
Gassebner, Martin
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper: Public Choice 3957
Abstract: 
We analyze the influence of IMF and World Bank programs on political regime transitions. We develop an extended version of Acemoglu and Robinson's [American Economic Review 91, 2001] model of political transitions to show how the anticipation of new loans from in-ternational financial institutions can trigger political transitions which would not otherwise have taken place. We test this unexplored implication of the theory empirically. We find in a world sample from 1970 to 2002 that the anticipation of receiving new programs immediately after a political regime transition increases the probability of a transition from autocracy to democracy and reduces the probability of democratic survival.
Subjects: 
political transitions
democracy
autocracy
IMF
World Bank
JEL: 
O19
D72
F59
F53
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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