Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/63095 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2000
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Memorandum No. 2000,38
Verlag: 
University of Oslo, Department of Economics, Oslo
Zusammenfassung: 
The concepts of sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability are defined in an epistemic model by means of lexicographic probabilities. These are non-equilibrium analogs to sequential and quasi-perfect equilibrium, for which epistemic characterizations are provided. The defined rationalizability concepts are shown to imply backward induction in generic perfect information games, but they do not yield forward induction. The relationship between various concepts are shown and illustrated.
JEL: 
C72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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