Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/63043
Authors: 
Henningsen, Morten
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Memorandum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo 2006,04
Abstract: 
This study describes the probability of transition from unemployment with unemployment insurance (UI) to sickness with sickness insurance (SI), using a grouped proportional hazard duration model and 9 years of monthly panel data. The combination of duration-limited UI and the fact that SI rights do not depend on remaining UI, creates an incentive to apply for SI, which is strongest immediately before UI expires. Estimation shows that the sickness hazard increases by around 50% when UI is about to end. Data on the sickness spells reveal that those who were given SI shortly before UI expired, are more likely to fully exploit the maximum of 12 months SI.
Subjects: 
Unemployment insurance
sickness insurance
unemployment duration
JEL: 
C41
I18
J64
J65
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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