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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Memorandum No. 2006,04
Verlag: 
University of Oslo, Department of Economics, Oslo
Zusammenfassung: 
This study describes the probability of transition from unemployment with unemployment insurance (UI) to sickness with sickness insurance (SI), using a grouped proportional hazard duration model and 9 years of monthly panel data. The combination of duration-limited UI and the fact that SI rights do not depend on remaining UI, creates an incentive to apply for SI, which is strongest immediately before UI expires. Estimation shows that the sickness hazard increases by around 50% when UI is about to end. Data on the sickness spells reveal that those who were given SI shortly before UI expired, are more likely to fully exploit the maximum of 12 months SI.
Schlagwörter: 
Unemployment insurance
sickness insurance
unemployment duration
JEL: 
C41
I18
J64
J65
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
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