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Fainmessery, Itay P.
Goldberg, David A.
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Brown University, Department of Economics 2011-2
We present a model of repeated games in large buyer-seller networks in the presence of reputation networks via which buyers share information about past transactions. The model allows us to characterize cooperation networks - networks in which each seller cooperates (by providing high quality goods) with every buyer that is connected to her. To this end, we provide conditions under which: [1] the incentives of a seller s to cooperate depend only on her beliefs with respect to her local neighborhood - a subnetwork that includes seller s and is of a size that is independent of the size of the entire network; and [2] the incentives of a seller s to cooperate can be calculated as if the network was a random tree with seller s at its root. Our characterization sheds light on the welfare costs of relying only on repeated interactions for sustaining cooperation, and on how to mitigate such costs.
moral hazard
graph theory
repeated games
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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