Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Dreher, Axel
Gould, Matthew
Rablen, Matthew
Vreeland, James Raymond
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper: Public Choice 3902
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the foremost international body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. Members vote on issues of global importance and consequently receive perks - election to the UNSC predicts, for instance, World Bank and IMF loans. But who gets elected to the UNSC? Addressing this question empirically is not straightforward as it requires a model that allows for discrete choices at the regional and international levels; the former nominates candidates while the latter ratifies them. Using an original multiple discrete choice model to analyze a dataset of 180 elections from 1970 to 2005, we find that UNSC election appears to derive from a compromise between the demands of populous countries to win election more frequently and a norm of giving each country its turn. Involvement in warfare lowers election probability, but there is little evidence that the level of economic development or foreign aid predict election.
United Nations Security Council
turn-taking norm
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
431.52 kB

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.