Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/57492 
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods No. 2010,43
Publisher: 
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn
Abstract: 
We show that a steeply increasing workload before a deadline is compatible with time-consistent preferences. The key departure from the literature is that we consider a stochastic environment where success of effort is not guaranteed.
Subjects: 
Increasing Workload
Deadline
Stochasticity
JEL: 
D81
D91
J22
D11
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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