Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55854
Authors: 
Mayer, Wolfgang
Mujumdar, Sudesh
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Economics Discussion Papers 2012-15
Abstract: 
This paper introduces an alternative to the lobbying literature's standard assumption that money buys policies. Our model - in which influence-seeking requires both money to buy access and managerial time to utilize access - offers three significant benefits. First, it counters criticism that the money-buys-policies assumption is at odds with reality. Second, its much stronger lobbying incentives weaken the free-rider problem and raise incentives for lobby formation. Third, the model yields testable hypotheses on: the determinants of lobbying incentives; the number of lobbying firms in an industry; and the impact on industry lobbying by the size distribution of firms, contribution limits on firms, world price changes, and the ability to adjust labor employment.
Subjects: 
lobbying
free-rider problem
size-distribution-of-firms
world-price
labor-market-flexibility
JEL: 
F16
H0
L1
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/de/deed.en
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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