Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51846
Authors: 
Cigno, Alessandro
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion paper series // Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 5663
Abstract: 
As credit and insurance markets are imperfect, and given that intra-family transfers, and the way a child uses her time outside school hours, are private information, the second-best policy makes school enrollment compulsory, forces overt child labour below its efficient level (if positive), and uses a combination of need and merit based grants, financed by earmarked taxes, to relax credit constraints, redistribute and insure. Existing conditional cash transfer schemes can be made to approximate the second-best policy by incorporating these principles in some measure.
Subjects: 
child labour
education
uncertainty
moral hazard
optimal taxation
JEL: 
D82
H21
H31
I28
J24
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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